![]() With this check you are only creating false positives while ignoring all other vectors of attack. This reinforces the statement that anti-exploiting systems must be game-specific. The underlying design problem is targeting latency instead of the broader problems that “lag switches” cause, which depends on the game, but can often be: “noclipping” through objects or avoiding obstacles, abusing client-side hit registration to damage players while being otherwise invulnerable or at a different location, etc. ![]() This is not just because players would inevitably trigger this check, which makes it a bad idea in the first place. No game is supposed to implement a system to punish a player specifically for having high latency or a period of no connection. The ping check, to start with, is fairly redundant. That being said, simple code review immediately brings out both design issues and bypass vulnerabilities in the few existing “checks”. They must also compromise between being able to detect broad ranges of cheats and remain accurate enough to prevent false positives. Systems to prevent or mitigate exploiting must be game-specific, as they have to account for game mechanics and the attack surface of implementations (such as sprinting, teleporting, weapons). RBXL file rotting in your home directory. Analysis of the source code isn’t required to conclude that this (like any other public / non-game-specific) “anti-cheat” is not suitable for use in production or any practical environment outside of a.
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